Today the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. __ (2025). I was eagerly awaiting the Court’s decision there, as I had cited that (then-pending) case in a petition for writ of certiorari I filed in September 2024: Abdelsayed v. Affordable Aerial Photography, Inc. My clients sought to be vindicated for their victory against a copyright troll and be deemed the “prevailing party.” While a final petition for rehearing is still pending in that case as of this writing, it seems doubtful the high court will grant cert. Even if it doesn’t, all will not have been lost in my first trip to the Supreme Court. I can now say that even if my clients’ case is not accepted for plenary review, my advocacy directly resulted in a meaningful and important clarification of federal law that will need to be further developed by the civil defense bar.
The Lackey Footnote
My clients’ petition’s influence on Lackey is the best I could have hoped for absent a cert grant or a GVR. The majority opinion includes a singular footnote that makes explicit a primary argument I made in my clients’ petition: that there are different rules for when a defendant is the prevailing party:
*A different body of caselaw addresses when a defendant is a “prevailing party” for the purposes of other fee-shifting statutes. Our decision today should not be read to affect our previous holding that a defendant need not obtain a favorable judgment on the merits to prevail, nor to address the question we left open of whether a defendant must obtain a preclusive judgment in order to prevail. See CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 578 U. S. 419, 431−434 (2016). As we have explained,“[p]laintiffs and defendants come to court with different objectives.” Id., at 431.
If you read my clients’ cert petition, you will notice that I had cited Lackey in multiple places. That case was still pending when I filed the petition for certiorari, and I noted it could further confuse the lower courts if it were decided in a way that didn’t make clear which kind of party (plaintiff or defendant) the decision applied to:
More precise guidance for each type of litigant is needed to avoid further confusion and stem the drift away from historic, commonsense understanding of what it means for a defendant to prevail. That confusion may only increase without a concurrent counterpart to the Court’s decision this term in Lackey v. Stinnie, 144 S. Ct. 1390 (2024), because plaintiffs’ and defendants’ objectives in litigation are different, CRST, 578 U.S. at 431.
Besides the explicit separation of prevailing defendant cases from prevailing plaintiff cases, the final quotation of CRST in the Lackey footnote drives home why that is so: plaintiffs and defendants are not the same. The party’s objectives are central to determining whether that party has prevailed. A defendant wants to end the lawsuit, irrespective of how that occurs. The plaintiff, by contrast wants something from the defendant, and is invoking the power of the court to obtain that remedy. All of this is part of the rationale of CRST, but, as I explain below, courts have shrugged off that part in favor of their fixation on Buckhannon.
Impact of the Abdelsayed Cert Petition
The Lackey footnote is not mere happenstance. It is clearly a direct consequence of my clients’ cert petition. I made explicit that how Lackey framed the question was dangerously ambiguous, which simply referred to “a party” without identifying which type of party. I very forcefully noted that there was an “ongoing lack of appreciation for the ‘different objectives’ of the various types of litigants” in the lower courts, with a stern warning that “a decision in Lackey could easily be misread and misapplied by courts if not thoughtfully counterbalanced by an explicitly defendant-framed decision on preclusive judgments.” Pet. at 30. My goal was to show how the circuits have misread CRST and try to prevent yet another SCOTUS decision that too loosely spoke about what it means for “a party” to prevail. A broad, non-specific label of “party” in Lackey would have further compounded the already perniciously pervasive problem in the lower courts. Thankfully the Court got the message. While I had hoped my arguments would lead the Court to grant cert in my clients’ case, I’ll accept the footnote as a consolation prize.
Even though the Supreme Court didn’t grant cert in my clients’ case, the Lackey footnote is poised to become very important in future fees litigation. It is a clear signal to the lower courts that there are at least two separate lines of cases: prevailing plaintiff cases and prevailing defendant cases. They’re an entirely “different body of caselaw.” Lackey, 604 U.S. at __ . The Supreme Court has now clearly warned the lower courts that they should not rely on prevailing plaintiff cases when evaluating whether a defendant has prevailed (which is what the Eleventh Circuit has done). It has made the distinction explicit and that CRST is one of the those cases which is part of a “different body of caselaw.” It really ought to have been more careful and clear in its CRST opinion, but oh well. The Abdelsayed petition briefed that issue thoroughly, though CopyCat Legal’s opposition was a sad, sad response that likely doomed certiorari not on the merits of its arguments, but perhaps because of what I view as Daniel DeSouza’s substandard advocacy. I might post about that separately. He should have invested more energy in his opposition brief, but that’s not unlike him. In fairness, he wasn’t being paid for that work, since, as is his firm’s usual practice (to my knowledge) he works on a pure contingency fee basis, and there was no way he would ever be paid for his efforts after he (his client, Robert Stevens) abandoned the lawsuit. But that shouldn’t be any excuse for one’s first opportunity before the highest court in the land.
Crucially, the footnote necessarily means the prevailing defendant jurisprudence does not include Buckhannon, because that was a prevailing plaintiff case, whereas CRST was a prevailing defendant case. Reinforcing that conclusion is the fact that the Court cites and discusses Buckhannon throughout Lackey, but never cites CRST with the exception of the footnote.
What remains to be seen is whether the lower courts will reevaluate their prevailing defendant decisions in light of the footnote that now correctly separates CRST from Buckhannon. So far, they haven’t properly understood CRST. That’s a shame, because to me, it’s as plain as day what that case stands for based on how the Supreme Court’s opinion is structured.
More Influence of Abdelsayed on Lackey
Besides the footnote, I am fairly confident that at least one other aspect of Lackey is attributable to the arguments raised in my clients’ petition. By now all should understand that the Supreme Court’s analytical framework is textualism and history. To give my clients the best shot at winning, I relied on those kinds of arguments, which included analyzing the Copyright Act’s fee-shifting provision. Like many such statutes, it refers to “the action” as the setting in which a party prevails. Seems simple enough, but that nuance is lost on many circuit court decisions that have wrongly held a defendant cannot be the prevailing party without a “preclusive” judgment (i.e. where the plaintiff is theoretically prevented from filing another lawsuit over the same issue). Basically, courts have decided that a dispute must be fully laid to rest, not just the lawsuit’s end.
The Abdelsayed cert petition laid out the basics of what would be argued at the merits stage. That included an argument that the “action” is what ends, not the dispute, which makes a party prevailing “in” that action. Pet. at 23. That means the circuit courts’ “risk of refiling” test is wrong. The Abdelsayed reply brief further made that point front and center, citing a treatise from 1925 that makes clear a defendant is (or at least historically was considered) the prevailing party even if the plaintiff could file a new action. Reply at 7-9. And so I was pleased to see critical emphasis on that distinction in Lackey.
In responding to Justice Jackson’s dissent (joined by Sotomayor), the Chief Justice wrote that “they assume that the favorable resolution of a dispute is tantamount to success on a claim in a legal action.” His emphasis on “dispute,” “claim,” and “action” is yet another clue for lower courts to heed; that this whole “risk of refiling” rationale is wholly bogus made-up nonsense. While Lackey will be added to the prevailing plaintiff “body of case law,” this part of the decision illustrates how the Court is likely to understand the word “action” appearing in a fee-shifting statute when the fee applicant is a defendant. In other words, this rationale is an indirect rebuke of the “risk of refiling” test now employed by the majority of circuits. It is not the termination of a dispute that makes a party prevailing, but rather the end of an action. That’s the word in the statute. And an action is just another word for lawsuit.
A final tidbit in Lackey might also be helpful in correcting the lower courts’ erroneous views: a voluntary dismissal is not an “external” event to the action; it is central to the action’s termination and occurs / is a filing within the litigation. It is therefore unlike a defendant’s out of court voluntary change in conduct that has the legal effect of mooting the action.
The Future for Prevailing Defendants
Without a Supreme Court opinion further elaborating on what it means for a defendant to prevail besides CRST, defendants will be left with that lone case and the Lackey footnote as guidance from the Supreme Court. It will likely still be an uphill battle to convince the federal judiciary that Buckhannon doesn’t apply to defendants. Defense bars and insurance carriers ought to take notice of the Lackey footnote, and be prepared to argue for their clients’ status as the prevailing defendant when a plaintiff gives up, especially when copyright trolls do.
Updated: March 13, 2025, to reflect that the Court denied my clients’ petition for rehearing.
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